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“Ooh it Makes Me Wonder”: Do the Courts Finally 
Understand the Problems with Copyright Infringement 
and Pop Music? 
Kate Camarata* 
“Writing has laws of perspective, of light and shade,  
just as a painting does, or music.  
If you are born knowing them, fine. 
If not, learn them. Then rearrange the rules to suit 
yourself.”1  
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INTRODUCTION 
The interaction between music and law is unique to copyright 
litigation. Music is “commonly regarded as a rule-free zone,” whereas the 
law is structured and, in essence, the “origin for rules.”2 Because “direct 
evidence of copying is seldom available” in music infringement cases, 
plaintiffs largely rely on circumstantial evidence.3 Given this fact, courts 
deciding music infringement cases began to recognize the inherent issues 
with applying copyright law to music.4 As the seminal music copyright 
infringement case across the federal courts, Arnstein v. Porter 
amalgamated the then-prevailing wisdom regarding access, similarity, 
expert testimony, and the role of juries.5 
The plaintiff in this case, Ira Arnstein, was a mildly successful 
musical composer during the Tin Pan Alley-era who was convinced that 
fellow composers, including famous songwriter Cole Porter, were stealing 
his works to profit from them.6 Consequently, he filed a number of 
infringement lawsuits against fellow composers.7 Arnstein demanded a 
jury trial, but Porter moved to strike this demand and moved for summary 
judgment.8 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Porter, 
and Arnstein appealed.9 In this decision, Judge Frank, writing for the 
Second Court of Appeals, stated that the appropriateness of a jury trial 
turned on whether a dispute as to the facts existed—specifically whether 
there were sufficient similarities between Arnstein’s original and the 
Porter’s song to prove copying.10 The court noted in this regard that 
“analysis (‘dissection’) [of the works] is relevant, and the testimony of 
 
 2. Iyar Stav, Musical Plagiarism: A True Challenge for the Copyright Law, 25 DEPAUL J. ART, 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 2 (2014). 
 3. Margit Livingston & Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music: Determining 
Whether What Sounds Alike Is Alike, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 227, 258 (2013). 
 4. See infra Part I.B explaining the difficulties of proving access and similarity in music 
copyright infringement cases. See generally the following cases that discuss the two aforementioned 
elements: Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 275–7 (2d Cir. 1936); Fred Fisher, 
Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 877 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1910). 
 5. See generally Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).  
 6. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467–68. 
 7. See B. MacPaul Stanfield, Finding the Fact of Familiarity: Assessing Judicial Similarity Tests 
in Copyright Infringement Actions, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 489, 489–90 (2001) (Arnstein “also believed 
plagiarists had deprived him of the rewards of his talent by infringing upon the copyrights to his 
compositions to their personal aggrandizement”). 
 8. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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experts may be received to aid the trier of the facts.”11 Therefore, experts 
may deconstruct a musical composition into its components’ parts (i.e., 
melody, harmony, rhythm, texture, and formal structure) and use their 
expertise to help a trier of fact make informed decisions regarding the 
resemblance between two works according to music theory.12 Arnstein is 
of great importance to the discussion of this Note because it instituted the 
two-pronged substantial similarity test that courts still use today. The 
purpose of this Note is to examine the difficulties of utilizing this test as it 
applies to popular music through the recent Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin 
decision.13 As Arnstein became a widely followed precedent, music 
copyright holders were in the prime economic position—they owned 
exclusive rights to sheet music reproductions, mechanical reproductions 
of their music, public performances, and arrangements or adaptations of 
their musical compositions. 
When music copyright law came into existence in the early 1800s, 
music was “far more of a one-dimensional entity, much like a book, a map, 
or other work of authorship;”14 however, as music evolved into a more 
prominent commodity within society, music copyright law remained 
stagnant, despite the cultural and technological changes that altered how 
music was consumed. Since the 1950s, music has become an even greater 
commodity with the advent of major technological advances. Cassette 
tapes—and eventually compact discs—facilitated rapid-fire copying 
through the exchange of compositions between individuals.15 Personal 
listening devices, like the Apple iPod and Sony Walkman, provided music 
at any venue, whether public or private.16 Additionally, “the Internet has 
[also] made the procurement of all types of music incredibly easy, and 
monstrously cost effective.”17 For instance, with a quick subscription to 
Spotify, users gain access to over 30 million songs within its library, which 
quantifiably translates into “one song for every second of every day for 
almost a year (347 days).”18 The development of technology has made 
music more easily accessible and digestible, which has offered no shortage 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. See CATHERINE SCHMIDT-JONES, THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF MUSIC 1 (2009). 
 13. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 14. J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright Protection, 
10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 419 (2004). 
 15. Id. at 418; see also Martin F. Halstead, The Regulated Become the Regulators, Problems and 
Pitfalls in the New World of Digital Copyright Legislation, 38 TULSA L. REV. 195, 199–201 (2001). 
 16. Keyes, supra note 14, at 418. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Mick Symons, Spotify: Everything You Need to Know!, DIVERSITY FUND (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.imore.com/spotify [https://perma.cc/9HRN-WRQF]. 
864 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 44:861 
of music copyright infringement lawsuits.19 Yet, as the technology 
advanced, the standard for music copyright infringement never followed. 
As a result, courts apply the same standard utilized in 1950 for music 
created within the new 2020s decade. 
The process of determining whether music infringement exists relies 
on the inherent subjectivity of the listener to discern if substantial 
similarity20 between two musical works exists. The peculiar characteristics 
of music bear significantly on each listener; consumers absorb, appreciate, 
and retain music differently than plays, novels, or visual and architectural 
works. In fact, studies suggest that a particular area of the brain that 
comprehends and stores musical information exists.21 However, both 
Congress and courts even today continue to treat music like other types of 
works of authorship by approaching issues of protection and infringement 
in the same manner.22 Because current copyright laws cover such a broad 
scope of works,23 the standards adopted by courts to assess substantial 
similarity are unclear, leading to results that are inevitably ad hoc.24 
Accordingly, this one-size-fits-all formulation poses issues for 
adapting copyright to the context of music.25 The purpose of copyright law 
is to encourage artistic and creative expression by providing incentives to 
 
 19. In fact, from 1950 to 2000, there were forty-three reported cases dealing with music 
copyright infringement, nearly twice as many as compared within the previous fifty-year period 
(1900–1950). See Keyes, supra note 14, at 418. 
 20. Substantial similarity is defined as “a level of similarity that shows improper appropriation 
of the plaintiff’s work. . . . If the similarity of the defendant’s work to protectable elements in the 
plaintiff’s work is minimal, or if similarity only exists with regard to unprotectable elements of the 
work, then there is no substantial similarity.” Substantial Similarity, U. MICH. LIBR. RSCH. GUIDES 
(May 16, 2020), https://guides.lib.umich.edu/substantial-similarity/glossary#s-lg-box-wrapper-
21057273 [https://perma.cc/FDP2-B2Q6]. 
 21. See ELENA MANNES, THE POWER OF MUSIC: PIONEERING DISCOVERIES IN THE NEW 
SCIENCE OF SONG 27–39 (2011) (describing various neuroscientific studies of music and the brain, 
including one that identified the rostomedial pre-frontal cortex as the primary area of the brain 
stimulated when one listens to music). 
 22. Keyes, supra note 14, at 410. 
 23. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Copyright protection covers the following works of authorship in 
the following categories: “(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound 
recordings; and (8) architectural works.” Id. 
 24. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 25. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and 
Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 457, 556 (2006); see, e.g., Lisa Gitelman, Reading Music, Reading 
Records, Reading Race: Musical Copyright and the U.S. Copyright Act of 1909, 81 MUSICAL Q. 265, 
273 (1997) (discussing how intellectual property rights in cases of music were difficult because the 
“legal standards of intellectual property were written, published works or visually apprehended works” 
that courts could construe as “protected ‘writings’”). 
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authors;26 yet it simultaneously limits protection, thereby allowing society 
to benefit from new ideas and information.27 The law neither adequately 
measures how music is perceived and comprehended by society nor 
promotes copyright law’s broader policy goals.28 Instead, the law needs to 
be tailored to provide greater flexibility for the manner in which people 
are allowed to respond to the music they perceive. Therefore, current 
music copyright law should be changed to reflect the modern regime of 
popular music consumption in order to adequately provide protection for 
musical artists. 
This Note explores the inherent weaknesses with the substantial 
similarity test for copyright infringement as it relates to popular music 
through the lens of the recent Ninth Circuit case, Skidmore v. Led 
Zeppelin.29 The importance of this 2020 en banc opinion should not go 
unnoticed; the rehearing of this case resolved issues related to music and 
copyright law and established a new precedent30 for the aforementioned 
substantial similarity test.31 For purposes of this Note, “pop music” shall 
mean music written, marketed, and intended to achieve mass distribution 
and mass appeal. However, this term should not be confused with the 
genre of pop music. Instead, the term “pop music” as used throughout this 
Note should be thought of as an umbrella category of music—
encompassing smaller subgenres like rock and pop—that is designed to 
achieve commercialized, monetary gains. Pop music arguably derives its 
success from its harmonies and chord progressions.32 The “limited number 
of notes and chords available to composers” within music generally 
contributes to the issues that are inherent to copyright claims involving 
pop music.33 Given the fact that most musical works, including pop music, 
 
 26. See Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 285 (2004) 
(“It is not wrong or inaccurate to say that copyright is a system of property rights designed to encourage 
creation.”). 
 27. See generally Mike Masnick, Yes, Copyright’s Sole Purpose is to Benefit the Public, 
TECHDIRT (Apr. 10, 2012), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120407/00171418416/yes-
copyrights-sole-purpose-is-to-benefit-public.shtml [https://perma.cc/VR34-CVEF]. 
 28. See generally Keyes, supra note 14. 
 29. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 30. Skidmore, 905 F.3d 1050. The Ninth Circuit in its en banc decision overruled the inverse 
ration rule, which allows for a lower standard of proof for the substantial similarity prong of copyright 
infringement when a higher degree of access was found. Although an important change to the future 
of music copyright cases, this aspect of the opinion will not be discussed in this Note. 
 31. As of October 5, 2020, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See Ben Sisario, Led Zeppelin 
Wins Long ‘Stairway to Heaven’ Copyright Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.ny 
times.com/2020/10/05/arts/music/stairway-to-heaven-led-zeppelin-lawsuit.html 
[https://perma.cc/6CH3-AUN9]. 
 32. See CHRISTOPHER DOLL, HEARING HARMONY: TOWARD A TONAL THEORY FOR THE ROCK 
ERA 7 (2017). 
 33. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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tend to borrow elements from other musical works, the substantial 
similarity test creates problems when employed within the musical 
context. 
Part I of this Note will review the history and purpose of copyright 
protection as well as explain the current tests utilized by courts in 
copyright infringement cases. This Part will also show the difficulties of 
applying these tests to music. Part II will provide a brief explanation of the 
basics of Western music theory and composition. This Part will also 
explore characteristics that have contributed to what makes pop music so 
appealing to mass audiences. Part III will explain information regarding 
the facts and holding of the three-member Ninth Circuit panel decision of 
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin. Finally, Part IV will examine the holdings of 
the en banc opinion in Skidmore and explain why this decision ultimately 
changed music copyright law for the better by providing a set of guidelines 
that should allow courts to now make better informed decisions regarding 
pop music plagiarism. 
I. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO MUSIC 
The challenges that arise when applying copyright law to musical 
works are rooted in the history of copyright law itself. Most of these issues 
facing music copyright stem from the very purpose for which copyright 
was invented.34 The objective of “copyright law is to create the most 
efficient and productive balance between protection (incentive) and 
dissemination of information, to promote learning, culture and 
development.”35 In order to determine how the law should change, we 
must consider not only the history of the copyright statute but also how the 
law currently applies to music. By tracing historical and legislative 
developments and the evolution of the copyright infringement tests, this 
Part outlines the development of the copyright infringement doctrine and 
shows the difficulties of applying copyright infringement tests in a pop 
music context. 
A. Early and Current Legislation 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution empowers 
Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”36 Accordingly, the 
Constitution provides Congress with the means to enact copyright laws in 
 
 34. See Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV. 907, 934 (2005). 
 35. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab’y, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 
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order to promote the public welfare.37 Congress’s first exercise of this 
explicit power was The Copyright Act of 1790 (the 1790 Act).38 
Conflicting state copyright laws created a need for a uniform national 
system and, to that end, the 1790 Act was created.39 
The Act was initially intended to protect only literary property.40 It 
was not until the Copyright Act of 1831 that Congress explicitly extended 
copyright protection to musical compositions, giving owners of copyright 
in music compositions the same rights as those enjoyed by copyright 
owners of literary works.41 However, at this time, protection was only 
extended to unauthorized printing and distribution of sheet music because 
during this period music could only be fixed within this medium.42 In early 
music copyright cases, judges used their discretion to determine whether 
copyright infringement existed, and courts tended to analyze music 
infringement claims using the same rules and standards used for 
infringement claims involving works of literary authorship.43 It is 
important to realize, however, that the music “industry” in  
those days operated in a similar fashion to other sectors of publishing 
industry at that time (i.e., “printing copies and selling those hard copies to 
the public through retail outlets and roving salesman”).44  
Therefore, “[b]ecause music had similar commercial qualities to  
books,” Congress conceptualized music in the same way as  
other works protected by copyright.45 
 
 37. See United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html [https://perma.cc/M5H7-NXUR] [hereinafter A Brief 
Introduction and History]. 
 38. ROBERT P. MERGES, MARK A. LEMLEY & PETER S. MENELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 386 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 1, 8–9 (1993) 
(explaining how development of the printing press prompted the idea that authors could have 
intangible property rights beyond a written manuscript); see also Mark Rose, Copyright and Its 
Metaphors, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3, 6–10 (2002) (explaining the concept of a book as a form of real 
estate and how copyright protections function in the same manner for both literary and real property). 
 41. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. XVI § 4. 
 42. A Brief Introduction and History, supra note 37. 
 43. See, e.g., Jollie v. Jacques, 13 F. Cas 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437) (one of the first 
music copyright cases reported, which set the judicial precedent for treating music in the exact same 
fashion as any other work protected by copyright); see also Keyes, supra note 14, at 410. 
 44. See Keyes, supra note 14, at 412; see also DAVID A. JASEN, TIN PAN ALLEY: THE 
COMPOSERS, THE SONGS, THE PERFORMERS AND THEIR TIMES at xvi (1988). 
 45. See Keyes, supra note 14, at 412. 
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By 1909, a bill was introduced that significantly changed the 1790 
Act46 due to the technological advances of the time.47 For example, in less 
than a decade after Edwin Votey invented the pianola,48 approximately 
“seventy-five thousand player pianos in the United States, and over a 
million piano rolls were sold.”49 The 1909 bill “broadened the scope of 
categories protected by copyright to include all works of authorship, and 
extended the term of protection to twenty-eight years with a possible 
renewal of twenty-eight [years].”50 This modification resulted from new 
mechanisms for creating and distributing works of authorship, with sound 
recordings being one of the most prominent.51 However, it was not until 
1972 that “sound recordings” of musical compositions were considered 
“works of authorship” and consequently received protection under the 
copyright clause.52 
Thus, as music became more accessible in the early 1900s with the 
advent of new technologies, such as the radio, lawsuits increased when 
composers claimed that their musical pieces were “substantially similar” 
to other pieces.53 Between 1915 and 1950, “twenty-three reported federal 
cases directly centered on . . . specific music copyright issue[s].”54 
Consequently, federal courts began refining an actual legal test for music 
copyright, which placed “specific burdens on the plaintiff.”55 As 
previously mentioned, in Arnstein v. Porter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit redefined the legal standard used for music copyright 
infringement claims by establishing the “substantial similarity test,” a  
two-prong test in which the plaintiff must show: (1) that a defendant 
 
 46. The 1790 Act was the world’s first copyright law, providing authors with the sole right of 
printing their works for fourteen years past the date of publication. It is commonly known as the Statute 
of Anne. See, e.g., Gerard Magavero, The History and Background of American Copyright Law: An 
Overview, 6 INT’L J.L. LIBRS. 151–54 (1978). 
 47. See generally id. 
 48. “A pianola is a type of mechanical piano[,]” in which “air is forced through holes in a roll of 
paper to press the keys” and play a song automatically. See Pianola, COLLINS DICTIONARY, 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/pianola [https://perma.cc/GE2L-KHCQ]. 
 49. EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 34 (2000). 
 50. Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N OF RSCH. LIBRS., 
https://www.arl.org/copyright-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/5BG2-4R7R]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Ryan Lloyd, Unauthorized Digital Sampling in the Changing Music Landscape, 22 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 148 (2014) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) and 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1998)). 
 53. Keyes, supra note 14, at 415; see also ROBERT EICHBERG, RADIO STARS OF TODAY 1 (1937). 
 54. Keyes, supra note 14, at 415. 
 55. Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial 
Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 728 (1987). 
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copied a plaintiff’s copyrighted work, and (2) that the copying 
“constitute[d] improper appropriation.”56 This test is still used today.57 
Here, the plaintiff must show that the copying was so extensive that 
the two works are “substantially similar.”58 The determination of this latter 
portion of the test involves a two-step process.59 The first step serves as an 
evidentiary tool, focusing on whether the defendant had access to the 
protected work; the second step addresses liability issues, requiring the 
plaintiff to prove the defendant’s work is substantially similar to their 
own.60 Although the steps of this test seem straightforward, it is 
susceptible to skewed results when courts apply it to musical works. Given 
the fact that most musical works, including pop music, tend to borrow 
elements from other musical works, the test creates problems when 
employed within the musical context. 
In 1976, Congress overhauled the Copyright Act to its current 
status.61 The Act extends protection to any original works of authorship 
that are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”62 The use of the 
word “expression” is significant because the Act explicitly excludes mere 
ideas from protection.63 The grant of copyright protection affords varying 
degrees of proprietorship in the work, including, but not limited to, 
exclusivity regarding reproductions, derivative remakes, and 
distributions.64 Section 106 of the Copyright Act defines six exclusive 
 
 56. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 57. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Phillips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 
1982); Blizzard Ent., Inc. v. Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co., 2018 WL 1242053, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
Within this recent case, the court directly quotes from Arnstein to establish whether both prongs of 
copyright infringement have been met. 
 58. Atari, Inc., 672 F.2d at 614 (citing Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 654 P.2d 204, 
207 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Cohen, supra note 47, at 728; see also Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of 
Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgements, 66 
IND. L.J. 175, 228 (1990).  
 61. A Brief Introduction and History, supra note 37. 
 62. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1990). 
 63. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)–(b) (1990) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work.”). 
 64. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1990) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright 
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce 
the copyrighted works in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by 
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to 
perform the copyrighted works publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly; (6) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
870 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 44:861 
rights of a copyright owner, whereas Section 114 discusses the scope of 
these rights.65 Finally, registration entitles a copyright owner, if successful 
in an infringement lawsuit, to statutory damages up to $150,000.66 
B. Copyright Infringement Tests 
To establish a prima facie case for copyright infringement, the 
plaintiff must prove: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, (2) actual 
copying, and (3) actionable copying.”67 In other words, copyright holders 
must show “both that copying has occurred (actual copying) and that the 
copied work is ‘substantially similar’ to the original copyrighted piece 
(actionable copying).”68 Direct evidence of actual copying rarely exists.69 
Therefore, to determine “actual copying,” the court examines: (1) whether 
the defendant “had access to the plaintiff’s work” during the time the 
defendant prepared his own work, and (2) whether there is “sufficient 
similarity between the works to prove copying.”70 Whether the defendant 
had access to the protected work serves as an evidentiary tool, but access 
by itself cannot be actionable; instead, the plaintiff must also prove the 
 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (7) in the case of 
sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.”). 
 65. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(a)–(b) (1990) (“(a) The exclusive rights of the owner of 
copyright in a sound recording are limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of 
section 106, and do not include any right of performance under section 106(4). (b) the exclusive right 
of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right 
to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly 
recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording. The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a 
sound recording under clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in 
which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in 
sequence or quality. The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clauses 
(1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that 
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or 
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording. The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in 
a sound recording under clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 106 do not apply to sound recordings 
included in educational television and radio programs . . . .”). 
 66. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1990). 
 67. See Moon Hee Lee, Note, Seeing’s Insight: Toward a Visual Substantial Similarity Test for 
Copyright Infringement of Pictorial, Graphic, and Sculptural Works, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 833, 839, 
839 n.33 (2017) (explaining how “the courts have had trouble separating the striking similarity related 
to actual copying and the substantial similarity related to actionable copying”). 
 68. Id. at 839–40. 
 69. See Lee, supra note 81, at 840. 
 70. Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Note, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing 
Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1375, 1387 n.58 (2007) 
(quoting ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT 
LAW § 3:1.1, at 3-3 (2003)). 
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defendant’s work is substantially similar to their own to constitute 
improper appropriation.71 
Once a plaintiff has proved the defendant copied his or her work, 
federal courts engage in different tests to determine whether works are 
“substantially similar.”72 Because most music copyright infringement 
cases are litigated in either the Second Circuit (New York City) or in the 
Ninth Circuit (Los Angeles), we will focus on the substantial similarity 
tests used in those courts73: (1) the “ordinary observer” test is associated 
with the Second Circuit and (2) the “extrinsic-intrinsic” test is associated 
with the Ninth Circuit.74 The  Second Circuit’s “ordinary observer test” 
for substantial similarity uses the aforementioned Arnstein v. Porter 
framework: once copying has been established, it asks “whether ‘an 
average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been 
appropriated from the copyrighted work.’”75 On the other hand, the Ninth 
Circuit’s “extrinsic-intrinsic” test for substantial similarity includes an 
objective inquiry and a subjective inquiry.76 The extrinsic prong requires 
“an objective comparison of specific expressive elements,” while the 
subjective-intrinsic prong asks the fact finder to focus on the “total concept 
and feel of the [two] works.”77 Though the majority of courts use one of 
these two tests, some variations still exist from circuit to circuit.78 While 
the tests seem relatively straightforward, they are inconsistently applied, 
thereby creating both confusion and unpredictability for courts and 
 
 71. Cohen, supra note 55, at 728; Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468; Atari, 672 F.2d at 614 (citing Warner 
Brothers, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 654 P.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Cohen, supra note 60, 
at 228. 
 72. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01(B) (2019) 
[hereinafter NIMMER]. 
 73. Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 317 (6th Cir. 
2004); see also NIMMER, supra note 72, § 13.03(E)(3). 
 74. Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc., 361 F.3d at 317. The importance of the Ninth and Second Circuits 
should not go unnoticed. The Ninth Circuit is commonly referred to as the “Hollywood” circuit 
because the majority of the copyright appeals originate in California, which is one home to the 
entertainment capital of the world. The Second Circuit includes New York City, birthplace of Tin Pan 
Alley, which was a collection of New York publishing and songwriting houses. Id. 
 75. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Folio 
Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 76. See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 77. See Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kouf v. 
Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 78. The Tenth Circuit uses an abstraction/filtration comparison test. The Sixth Circuit as well as 
the D.C. Circuit use a variation of this test. See Christopher Jon Sprigman & Samantha Fink Hedrick, 
The Filtration Problem in Copyright’s ‘Substantial Similarity’ Infringement Test, 23 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 571, 585 (2019). Before the Second and Ninth Circuits diverged, they used a test similar to 
the one the Eleventh Circuit uses today. For more information, see ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. 
OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW § 3, at 3–2 (2003). 
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litigants.79 Given the fact that most musical works, including pop music, 
tend to borrow elements from other  
musical works, the test creates problems when employed within the 
musical context. The following two sections consider these two tests in 
greater detail. 
1. The Second Circuit 
Those courts following the Second Circuit’s substantial similarity 
test employ Arnstein’s two-step process, also known as the “ordinary 
observer test,” in which a plaintiff must prove both “(a) that [the] 
defendant copied from [the] plaintiff’s copyrighted work and (b) that the 
copying (assuming it to be proved) went to [sic] far as to constitute 
improper appropriation” to establish infringement.80 Both of these 
inquiries are issues of fact for the jury.81 In determining whether actual 
copying exists (the first or “copying” prong), “analysis (‘dissection’)” is 
appropriate and “the testimony of experts may be received to aid the trier 
of the facts.”82 Once a court has determined that copying has occurred, it 
applies the ordinary observer test, deciding whether an unlawful 
appropriation that would rise to the level of infringement (the second or 
“improper-appropriation” prong) has also occurred.  
The ordinary observer test is grounded in gauging the reaction of an 
ordinary person; however, it is the trier-of-fact that “determines the issue 
in light of the impressions reasonably expected to be made upon the 
hypothetical ordinary observer.”83 The fact finder determines “whether an 
average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been 
appropriated from the copyrighted work.”84 In order to make this 
determination, courts must apply the same level of scrutiny as those that 
an ordinary consumer would use.85 As a result, dissection86 and expert 
 
 79. Jarrod M. Mohler, Comment, Toward a Better Understanding of Substantial Similarity in 
Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 971, 972 (2000). 
 80. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 81. Id. at 469. 
 82. Id. at 468. 
 83. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., 
dissenting); see also La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he ‘ordinary observer,’ like the ‘reasonable person’ in tort law, is a legal fiction; it is the measure 
by which the trier of fact judges the similarity of two works.”). 
 84. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Folio Impressions, 
Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 85. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 78, § 3, at 3–5 (courts must apply “consumer 
scrutiny as opposed to courtroom scrutiny”); see also Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, Inc., 193 F.3d 92, 102 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
 86. See generally Sarah Brashears-Macatee, Note, Total Concept and Feel or Dissection?: 
Approaches to the Misappropriation Test of Substantial Similarity, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 913, 921 
(1993) (detailing the dissection approach in copyright infringement cases). 
2021] “Ooh It Makes Me Wonder” 873 
testimony are not utilized in connection with this prong of the test.87 This 
point complicates copyright infringement for fact finders88 because most 
ordinary observers are likely incapable of detecting true appropriation.89 
2. The Ninth Circuit 
As distinct from the Second Circuit’s analysis discussed above, the 
Ninth Circuit’s substantial similarity test involves both extrinsic and 
intrinsic prongs.90 The extrinsic prong is objective in nature,91 
“depend[ing] not on the responses of the trier of fact, but on specific 
criteria which can be listed and analyzed.”92 In the extrinsic prong, the 
court lists, compares, and contrasts the elements involved within each 
work and then analyzes whether similarities in the expression of those 
elements exist.93 When applying the extrinsic prong, courts within the 
Ninth Circuit are instructed to “filter out and disregard the non-protectible 
elements in making [their] substantial similarity determination,” a process 
referred to as “analytical dissection.”94 This process involves “ 
breaking works down into their constituent elements and comparing those 
elements to determine whether the similarities that exist are in the 
unprotectible elements.”95 Expert testimony is admissible to assist the 
court in this type of analysis.96 
The intrinsic prong examines an ordinary person’s subjective 
impressions of similarities between the two works.97 This determination is 
 
 87. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468, 473. 
 88. See infra Part III. 
 89. See NIMMER, supra note 72, § 13.03(A)(1)(a) (“Obviously, no principle can be stated as to 
when an imitator has gone beyond the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression.’ Decisions must 
therefore inevitably be ad hoc.” (citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 
489 (2d Cir. 1960))). 
 90. See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 91. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the extrinsic part 
of the test is an objective analysis of expression). 
 92. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th 
Cir. 1977). 
 93. The elements the courts list and analyze are as follows: 
For example, with respect to literary works, the elements are plot, theme, dialogue, mood, 
setting, pace, sequence of events, and characters. For works of visual art, the criterion 
includes shapes, colors, and arrangements of the representations in addition to the type of 
artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the subject. 
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 78, § 3:2.1, at 3–24. 
 94. Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002); Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 
845. 
 95. See Roodhuyzen, supra note 70, at 1399. 
 96. Id. at 1400; see also Antonick v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 841 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016); 
Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845. 
 97. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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exclusively a question for the jury.98 The intrinsic prong subjectively 
evaluates whether a substantial similarity in expression exists by tracking 
the responses of an ordinary, reasonable observer.99 Unlike the extrinsic 
prong, expert testimony is not permitted in this part of the analysis.100 As 
such, fact finders face challenges because they are exposed to expert 
testimony when evaluating extrinsic similarities, yet they are  
required to disregard the testimony while evaluating similarities under this 
portion of the test. 
II. COMPONENTS OF COMPOSITION: USING MUSIC THEORY FOR MUSIC 
INFRINGEMENT CASES 
To fully understand the nature of the infringement claims in 
Skidmore, one must be familiarized with music theory. Given these strict 
legal tests, music is not always the easiest artistic medium to analyze 
within these parameters. Before addressing the facts and holding of 
Skidmore, the case in which unknown band Spirit sued the renowned rock 
legend Led Zeppelin for the opening riff in the song “Stairway to Heaven,” 
a brief discussion of the basics of Western music theory and composition 
is necessary. Music theory forms the building blocks of most copyright 
infringement legal theories, such as the one argued by Mr. Skidmore. 
Determining copyright infringement is a multilayered process and, 
as noted previously, courts often use expert testimony from a technical 
perspective to determine whether a defendant likely copied from the 
plaintiff.101 Due to the methodical aspects of music, expert testimony 
carries significant weight because compositional techniques and theories 
are often unfamiliar to a judge or jury.102 As musical experts, expert 
witnesses provide courts with a musicological framework by giving an 
opinion regarding whether the pattern of notes and chords appearing in the 
defendant’s work is likely to have been the product of independent 
creation, reliance on a common public domain source, or the plaintiff’s 
work.103 Because pop music has an arguably formulaic style, it is important 
to explain the rudimentary characteristics through music theory. 
 
 98. See id. at 1360–61. 
 99. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 945–46 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(describing use of experts in the extrinsic phase of the substantial similarity analysis). 
 102. See generally Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music 
Copyright Infringement Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 127 (1988). 
 103. See generally id. 
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A. Tonality in Western Music: The Basics 
Essentially, all Western music is rooted in the organization of eight 
notes on or around one principal tone.104 Various pitch organizations 
(whether melodic, harmonic, or contrapuntal), concepts of consonance and 
dissonance, and corresponding rhythm, beats, accents, and formal 
structure are all based on the principle of tonality. Whether listening to a 
Bach Prelude & Fugue,105 a tone poem by Debussy,106 a Beach Boys’ 
classic song,107 or Taylor Swift’s “Blank Space,” 108 even an uninformed 
ear will notice similarities between the each of the work’s melodic 
structure, tonality, and rhythmic patterns. Pop music arguably condenses 
the “more complex, layered musical elements of classical music” into a 
digestible format: A “speech-like style usually encapsulated in a simple 
two-or three-part form organized into four eight-bar phrases.”109 
Tonality can be conceptualized upon the idea that any form of 
Western music, whether an orchestral symphony or a number one hit song 
on the radio, is centered on one primary pitch or tone and seven other 
pitches or chords that gravitate away from and finally return back to this 
original pitch or tone.110 Key signature is essentially the note or pitch that 
is “considered home” for the song.111 The key signature acts as a barrier, 
determining the rules for the song by instructing the composer on what 
notes can and cannot be played.112 Each key contains a set number of 
sharps and flats.113 The seven subsidiary pitches are arranged in a fixed 
series of whole and half steps known as major, minor, or modal scalar 
patterns within an octave.114 These pitches may be major, melodic minor, 
or harmonic minor.115 
 
 104. See Brian Hyer, Tonality, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (Jan. 20, 2001), https://www.oxford 
musiconline.com/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo-9781561592630-e-
0000028102 [https://perma.cc/X3FL-2HDZ]. 
 105. See JOHANN SEBASTIAN BACH, THE WELL-TEMPERED CLAVIER: BOOK 1 (1722). 
 106. See CLAUDE DEBUSSY, LA MER (1905). 
 107. See THE BEACH BOYS, PET SOUNDS (1966). 
 108. See TAYLOR SWIFT, Blank Space, on 1989 (Big Machine Records 2014). 
 109. Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 3, at 240; see also John Covach, Form in Rock Music: 
A Primer, in ENGAGING MUSIC: ESSAYS IN MUSIC ANALYSIS 65, 69–74 (Deborah Stein ed., 2005). 
 110. See J. PETER BURKHOLDER, DONALD JAY GROUT & CLAUDE V. PALISCA, A HISTORY OF 
WESTERN MUSIC 305, 365 (7th ed. 2006); see also Hyer, supra note 104. 
 111. See generally Key Signature, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/art/key-
signature [https://perma.cc/BEJ2-F2ZW]. 
 112. Cf. id. 
 113. Id. Sharps consist of raised pitches, and flats consist of lowered pitches. Id. 
 114. See generally William Drabkin, Major, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (Jan. 20, 2001), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.53817 [https://perma.cc/5FKR-KVEQ]. 
 115. See generally id. 
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A key signature is made up of an arrangement of the aforementioned 
seven subsidiary pitches, which form a scale.116 A scale refers to a 
succession of pitches ascending or descending in two types of steps: half 
steps or whole steps.117 Western music theory is based on the chromatic 
scale, which a collection of twelve possible pitches that are commonly 
referred to as a “half tone” or “semitone.”118 The chromatic scale consists 
entirely of half steps, using every pitch on the keyboard within a single 
octave (the octave starts with the root note or “tonic” note and ends with 
the “octave” tonic note, which is exactly twice the pitch frequency of the 
root note).119 To illustrate, a chromatic scale in the key of C would look 
like the following:120 





Notice how an overlap occurs between the notes containing sharps 
and those containing flats (e.g., C# v. Db). These notes are  
called “enharmonic” because they are identical pairs of notes that can be 
written in two ways.122 The notes in the scale are defined by  
the key signature, which helps an individual understand which  
sharps and flats are used in a song.123 
The major scale is arguably the most recognizable in Western music. 
Think of the classic tune “Do-Re-Mi” sang by Julie Andrews in the 1965 
film The Sound of Music.124 This song is made up of major scale pitches, 
 
 116. Benjamin Hollis, Scales and Key Signatures, METHOD BEHIND THE MUSIC, https://method-
behind-the-music.com/theory/scalesandkeys/ [https://perma.cc/XNU7-EJ4M]. 
 117. Scales and Scale Degrees, OPEN MUSIC THEORY, http://openmusictheory.com/scales.html 
[https://perma.cc/N6AG-YQTJ]. 
 118. ETheory: Lesson 1.2—Scales, EASTMAN SCH. OF MUSIC: CTR. FOR MUSIC INNOVATION & 
ENGAGEMENT, https://www.esm.rochester.edu/iml/entrepreneurship/eTheory/New_Horizons/1-
2_Scales.php [https://perma.cc/5J9Y-BBDQ]. 
 119. BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 110. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Mark DeVoto, Enharmonic, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/art/enharmonic [https://perma.cc/2LBP-EA9E]. 
 123. The Complete Guide to Music Key Signatures, MERRIAM MUSIC (June 10, 2019), 
https://www.merriammusic.com/school-of-music/piano-lessons/music-key-signatures/ 
[https://perma.cc/4FBH-35J9]. 
 124. THE SOUND OF MUSIC (20th Century Fox Film Corp. 1965). 
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consisting of eight notes: the tonic (I), supertonic (II), mediant (III), 
subdominant (IV), dominant (V), submediant (VI), leading tone (VII), and 
octave tone (VIII). These notes are called scale degrees  
because they are placed in context of a specific scale.125 Solfège  
syllables, such as those in The Sound of Music (do, re, mi, etc.), can also 
be used to represent scale degrees.126 
Once the key in a given song is known, the ground rules for what can 
be played in that key are pre-determined. The key signature defines the 
chords associated within each scale because “each ‘key’ or ‘scale’ has 
certain sharps or flats associated with it.”127 Certain chords are reserved 
for particular scales.128 Therefore, the key of the song determines the notes 
within the scale, and subsequently, the notes of the scale determine the 
elements of a chord. 
“A chord is any combination of three or more pitch classes that sound 
simultaneously.”129 In their most basic structure, chords are comprised of 
three notes called “triads”: a “root” note, a third, and a fifth.130 Major triads 
are “built with a major third and a perfect fifth from the root.”131 Minor 
triads are built with a minor third and a perfect fifth from the root.132 If we 
build triads with each note in a key using only the notes available from its 
scale, the following pattern would emerge: Major, minor, minor, Major, 
Major, minor diminished.133 Roman numerals are used to indicate each 
chord’s position relative to the scale. Numerals that represent a major 
chord are capitalized, whereas minor and diminished chords are lower 
cased.134 Thus, using Roman numerals, the following pattern emerges for 
triads in all major keys: I, ii, iii, IV, V, vi, vii°.135 
 
 125. See Drabkin, supra note 115. 
 126. Id.; see also BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 110. 
 127. See Drabkin, supra note 115. 
 128. ChordWizard, Chord/Scale Relations, HOW MUSIC WORKS, 
https://www.howmusicworks.org/600/ChordScale-Relations/Chord-and-Scale-Relations 
[https://perma.cc/C8KV-79MB]. 
 129. Triads and Seventh Chords, OPENMUSICTHEORY.COM, http://openmusictheory.com/ 
triads.html [https://perma.cc/F9TY-4LF5]. 
 130. Introduction to Chords, MUSICTHEORY.NET, https://www.musictheory.net/lessons/40 
[https://perma.cc/SB4Z-5VJY]. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Mantius Cazaubon, Chords in the Key of C Major, PIANO KEYBOARD GUIDE, 
http://www.piano-keyboard-guide.com/key-of-c.html [https://perma.cc/4S2P-R6AD]. 
 134. Id. An “o” symbol denotes a diminished chord, where the chord is built on a minor third 
and a diminished fifth (the minor third is three half tones away from the root, and the diminished fifth 
is six half tones away from the root). See OPENMUSICTHEORY.COM, supra note Error! Bookmark 
not defined.. 
 135. Cazaubon, supra note 133. 
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This pattern is extremely useful for musicians because it establishes 
the framework for creating music, allowing composers and musicians to 
build off that structure. However, the rules provide only seven notes and 
seven combinations of notes that can be played in any key, thereby 
creating a catch-22 for musicians: While the rules of music theory offer 
musicians an ability to create, they simultaneously constrict musicians 
within the parameters of those set, available notes or chords.136 
B. Pop Music Characteristics 
What comprises pop music is difficult to pin down precisely. Pop 
music essentially encompasses many popular contemporary genres, such 
as rock, rap, and country.137 In Simon Frith’s essay, Pop Music, the British 
socio-musicologist explained that pop music is “music produced 
commercially, for profit, as a matter of enterprise not art.”138 While a 
generalization, pop music tends to be characterized by its simplicity; this 
quality may be what makes it “accessible to a general public  
(rather than aimed at elites or dependent on any kind of knowledge or 
listening skill).”139 To elucidate this point, Frith explains that pop  
music “is about giving people what they already know they want rather 
than pushing up against technological constraints or  
aesthetic conventions.”140 Ordinary listeners often identify with pop 
music, which usually “express[es] commonplace feelings—love, loss, 
jealousy,” instead of prompting listeners to realize “individual visions” or 
to “see the world in new ways.”141 
Pop music can be characterized as primarily vocal, and the themes of 
its songs are normally recognizable and easily understood.142 It can be 
argued then that pop music’s main appeals derives from its repetitive form, 
loud dynamics, and accented rhythm.143 Most pop songs are short—
 
 136. Nicholas Booth, Note, Backing Down: Blurred Lines in the Standards for Analysis of 
Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement for Musical Works, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 99, 116 
(2016). 
 137. SIMON FRITH, Pop Music, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO POP & ROCK MUSIC 93, 94 
(Simon Frith, Will Straw & John Street eds., 2001); Jamie Walsh, No Justice for Johnson? A Proposal 
for Determining Substantial Similarity in Pop Music, 16 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH, & INTELL. PROP. L. 
261, 275 (2006). 
 138. Frith, supra note 137, at 94–95; Walsh, supra note 137, at 275. 
 139. Frith, supra note 137, at 94; see Walsh, supra note 137, at 275. 
 140. Frith, supra note 137, at 96; see Walsh, supra note 137, at 275. 
 141. Frith, supra note 137, at 96; Walsh, supra note 137, at 275–76. 
 142. See MARIANNE WILLIAMS TOBIAS, CLASSICAL MUSIC WITHOUT FEAR: A GUIDE FOR 
GENERAL AUDIENCES 16 (2003). 
 143. Id. 
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averaging less than three minutes144—and the songs are characterized by 
a single melody with simple harmony accompaniment.145 Though pop 
music may add a distinct rock beat or clever rhythmic variances, such as 
syncopation or jazz harmonies, it exists for a short lifespan and thus the 
appeal is normally “immediately ascertainable.”146 Because pop music is 
arguably a commodity, at times little variance between songs of the same 
genre exist.147 Once a record company finds either a formula or a pattern 
that makes money in the market, it usually continues to utilize this 
technique repeatedly because music is profit-oriented.148 
In today’s music industry, much of pop music can be said to 
incorporate some spectacle, whether it be theatrical staging, backup 
singers, dance steps, or stage effects involving lighting or video 
projections.149 For instance, the late Michael Jackson incorporated a 
number of these elements into his videos.150 Similarly, Lady Gaga’s 2009 
album The Fame Monster focused on visual aspects in her music videos 
through outrageous costumes and entertaining choreography.151 Yet, Lady 
Gaga recently downplayed her normal visual spectacle with her 2016 
album, Joanne, which focused instead on emotionally connecting with 
audiences through lyrics that highlight her vocal feats.152 As artists 
continue to remove these extra productional variables, individuals will 
likely be able to more easily discern whether a song or other piece of music 
closely resembles an earlier work. Therefore, the central, musical 
characteristics of pop music remain even more significant. There are no 
shortages of pop stars in this day and age, but as their latest albums feature 
 
 144. B. LEE COOPER, POPULAR MUSIC PERSPECTIVES: IDEAS, THEMES, AND PATTERNS IN 
CONTEMPORARY LYRICS 4 (1991). 
 145. TOBIAS, supra note 142, at 16. 
 146. See Walsh, supra note 137, at 276. 
 147. See COOPER, supra note 144, at 4. 
 148. Walsh, supra note 137, at 276. 
 149. Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 3, at 253; see also Richard Middleton & Peter Manuel, 
Popular Music, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/grove 
music/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo-9781561592630-e-0000043179 
[https://perma.cc/F9W5-GWNN]. 
 150. See Michael Jackson, Thriller, YOUTUBE (Oct. 2, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sOnqjkJTMaA [https://perma.cc/U93T-N9S3]; Michael Jackson, 
Michael Jackson Super Bowl 1993 Performance HD, YOUTUBE (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nBkNQZ-6QHg [https://perma.cc/F2BS-QC79]. 
 151. See Lisa Robinson, In Lady Gaga’s Wake, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2012, at 50 (describing Lady 
Gaga’s evolution from struggling singer/songwriter to international style icon and mesmerizing 
performer). 
 152. See generally Hannah Ewens, The ‘Joanne’ Album Has Forever Changed Lady Gaga’s 
Live Show, NOISEY: MUSIC BY VICE (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xw43k3/lady-gaga-joanne-european-tour-2018-milan-review 
[https://perma.cc/HBV3-WK5V]. 
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simpler, stripped-back songs153 that focus less on production value and 
instead highlight the musician’s craftmanship or lyricism, possible 
copyright infringement becomes more apparent. 
Because pop music generally employs simple progressions that are 
easily digestible by the listener, the most common chord progressions, 
resolutions of dissonances, and melodic and harmonic shapes tend to be 
employed to create a “hit.”154 If pop music’s main goal is to maximize 
profits, then it must appeal to the largest possible population to do so. A 
potential way to accomplish this goal is through following a well-known 
chord pattern based on the tonic (I), leading to the subdominant (IV), 
creating tension with the dominant (V), and finally resolving the tension 
back to the tonic.155 Thus, the importance of music theory should not be 
overlooked as it defines the available building blocks that can lead to 
music infringement lawsuits. 
Pop music songs may arguably be prone to more music copyright 
infringement: pop music musicians are influenced by previous artists; 
artists in pop music tend to utilize the same formula; and the lucrative 
music business itself lends itself to high-profile litigation with large 
monetary damages. As a result, the “restrictions of Western tonal music, 
the relative simplicity of contemporary popular works, the commonality 
within genres, the rich shared musical heritage of most Western 
composers, and the vast and pervasive daily exposure to music 
experienced” can unsurprisingly result in the creation of two very similar 
works composed by two different composers.156 
III. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin 
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin was first filed in the Central District of 
California, and the defendants in this case, i.e., the band Led Zeppelin, 
won in a jury trial.157 Before addressing the facts of this case, it is 
important to provide the reader with a brief explanation of its complicated 
procedural history. Skidmore, the plaintiff, appealed to the Ninth Circuit 
 
 153. See Brennan Carley, Today’s Top Pop Producers Look Ahead to the Future of Music, SPIN 
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Court of Appeals, which, in its three-panel decision, found for the 
plaintiffs and ordered a new trial.158 The defendants appealed for a 
rehearing en banc, meaning the case was heard before eleven Ninth 
Circuit.159 The Ninth Circuit en banc reinstated the jury verdict and found 
for the defendants.160 The following section will address the strengths and 
weaknesses of the en banc decision in addition to the facts leading up to 
the multiple appeals. 
In 1967, Spirit released its first album, which included the song 
“Taurus.”161 A year later, Spirit toured across the United States to promote 
their new record.162 Led Zeppelin performed at the same venue, on the 
same day as Spirit, at least three times between 1968 and 1970.163 One of 
these instances was in 1968, when Led Zeppelin purportedly opened for 
Spirit in Denver, Colorado.164 Although surviving members of Led 
Zeppelin testified that they neither toured nor shared a stage with Spirit 
members, surviving members of Spirit recalled conversing with the band 
backstage as well as between both sets and performances.165 
After the tour, Led Zeppelin returned to England, and began work on 
one of their most successful albums, Led Zeppelin IV.166 The band 
recorded “Stairway to Heaven” and released the song as the fourth track 
on this album.167 Although the album received rave reviews, some within 
the music industry noticed similarities between “Stairway to Heaven” and  
“Taurus.”168 In fact, in 1991, Randy Wolfe, guitarist of Spirit, was asked 
in an interview for Time Circle about the possibility that Led Zeppelin had 
copied the opening of “Taurus” for “Stairway to Heaven.”169 Wolfe 
responded by stating, “I’ll let [Led Zeppelin] have the beginning of Taurus 
for their song without a lawsuit.”170 Wolfe kept this promise and never 
 
 158. See Jonathan Zavin & Mary Jean Kim, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, LOEB & LOEB LLP (Sept. 
28, 2018), https://www.loeb.com/en/ insights/publications/2018/10/skidmore-v-led-zeppelin 
[https://perma.cc/Q78F-LDLK]. See generally Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
 159. See Skidmore, 952 F.3d 1051. 
 160. Kyle Petersen & Wook Hwang, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, LOEB & LOEB LLP (Mar. 9, 
2020), https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/03/skidmore-v-led-zeppelin 
[https://perma.cc/PEU4-9JRQ]. 
 161. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV 15-3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 WL 1442461, at *2 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 8, 2016). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at *3. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
882 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 44:861 
filed suit.171 It was not until 2014 when Michael Skidmore, acting on 
behalf of Wolfe’s trust, brought an action against Led Zeppelin.172 
Skidmore alleged that the opening notes of “Stairway to Heaven” were 
copied from and are substantially similar to those in “Taurus.”173 The case 
proceeded to trial in the Central District of California; the jury returned a 
verdict for the defendants, “finding that the two songs were not 
substantially similar under the ‘extrinsic test,’ which objectively compares 
the protected areas of work.”174 
On appeal, Skidmore challenged: “(1) various jury instructions, (2) 
the district court’s ruling that substantial similarity must be proven using 
a copyright registration deposit copy, (3) the district court’s ruling that 
sound recordings could not be played to prove the defendants’ access to 
the song ‘Taurus,’ and (4) certain other evidentiary issues.”175 The Ninth 
Circuit explained that because ownership of the copyright of “Taurus” was 
not contested, the analysis turned on the second element of infringement, 
176 i.e., whether the defendants copied protected aspects of the song.177 
In the initial panel decision opinion of the case, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that 
selection and arrangement of unprotectable musical elements are, in fact, 
protectable.178 The court conceded that, in a musical context, the extrinsic 
prong is difficult to administer; although “individual elements of a song, 
such as notes or a scale, may not be protectable,” different combinations 
of elements may be protectable.179 The appellate court held that the district 
court’s failure to instruct the jury was especially problematic in this case 
because Skidmore’s expert testified that there was “extrinsic substantial 
similarity based on the combination of five elements.”180 
Regarding the jury instructions on originality, the Ninth Circuit 
agreed with Skidmore and held that the district court’s instructions 
opposed the Ninth Circuit’s 2004 Swirsky v. Mariah Carey opinion, 
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“which held that a limited number of musical notes can be protected by 
copyright.”181 The court determined that this error was not harmless 
because it “undercut testimony by the plaintiff’s expert that Led Zeppelin 
copied a chromatic scale that had been used in an original manner” by 
Spirit.182 The court noted that “nothing else in the instructions alerted the 
jury that the selection and arrangement of unprotectable elements could be 
copyrightable.”183 Although the rudimentary elements of music are not 
copyrightable184 and single musical notes lack copyright protection,185 the 
Ninth Circuit recognized in Swirsky that “an arrangement of a limited 
number of notes can garner copyright protection.”186 Therefore, the court 
ultimately concluded that the seven note guitar line that opens “Taurus” 
could be sufficient to garner copyright protection.187 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit determined in its initial opinion that 
the district court erred in its formulation of the jury instructions regarding 
originality. Jury Instruction No. 16 stated that “common musical  
elements, such as descending chromatic scales, arpeggios or short 
sequences of three notes” are not protected.188 However, the court 
determined that this instruction ran contrary to the aforementioned 
conclusion in Swirsky.189 The Ninth Circuit stated that this jury instruction 
“could have led the jury to believe that even if a series of three notes or a 
descending chromatic scale were used in combination with other elements 
in an original manner, it would not warrant copyright protection,” and 
consequently the jury could have reached a different verdict had the 
instruction been properly instructed.190 
IV. Skidmore En Banc Decision and Its Implications 
On March 9, 2020, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, published an 
entirely separate opinion on Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, upholding the 
district court jury verdict that the song “Stairway to Heaven” did not 
infringe on the 1968 song “Taurus.”191 This decision was vital to the future 
of pop music in copyright infringement cases because it finally offered 
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guidance as to what elements of pop music can be copyrighted. This part 
of the Note critiques the Ninth Circuit’s three-panel decision, highlighting 
the complications and dangerous precedent it would have set if the en banc 
court did not reverse the appellate decision. This part also addresses the 
strengths and weaknesses of the en banc ruling, commenting as to whether 
the court finally—for lack of a better phrase—got it right. 
During the rehearing en banc, the defendants argued that the panel 
was incorrect when it held that the district court erred by failing to give a 
selection and arrangement instruction. The ruling of the three-panel Ninth 
Circuit decision effectively expanded the basis for finding copyright 
infringement in music cases. The defendant correctly emphasized that the 
purported selection and arrangement presented by Spirit should not have 
been afforded copyright protection; instead, the alleged musical 
infringement was simply a random, unprotected combination of 
elements.192 The crux of the infringement allegation was a descending 
minor scale chromatic bass line. Without getting too entangled into a 
music theory analysis, both “Taurus” and “Stairway to Heaven” use this 
chromatic bass line ending on the fifth note, instead of the sixth note as 
indicated below.193 
To illustrate this descending bass line in both songs, below is a 
musical written notation of both songs side-by-side for comparison. The 
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circles notated on both photos below show the use of the above-mentioned 
chromatic bass line. It is true that both songs utilize the same set of notes 
depicted in the first diagram.  
 
As the diagrams demonstrate, both songs share the same four 
common chords, which are listed above the staff: A minor chord, G# 
Major seventh chord, C Major seventh chord with G in the bass, and a F 
Major seventh chord. However, the cadence (or rather the conclusion of 
the phrase), is different in both: a D Minor chord to an A Major chord 
concludes “Taurus,” whereas as a G Major chord with B in the bass line 
to an A Minor chord concludes “Stairway to Heaven.” 
In its three-panel opinion in Skidmore, the court incorrectly held that 
these trivial and commonplace similarities between two songs could 
constitute the basis for finding of infringement. But not all similarities 
amount to infringement. For instance, common phrases or short lyrics are 
not copyrightable.194 In Skidmore, only four notes are identical in 
comparison to the two riffs: the first three notes in each diagram (shown 
in the first box) and the C in the third bar (also boxed). Although the first 
three notes have the same rhythm, the melody departs in each song with 
the next note, creating different arrangements that ultimately should not 
constitute copyrightable material. 
The importance of this in-depth musical analysis should not be 
overlooked. The Ninth Circuit’s original holding in this case was in direct 
contravention to established copyright law: rudimentary building blocks 
of compositions cannot be protected.195 Accordingly, a moving chromatic 
bass line, which is arguably a common characteristic utilized in a variety 
of pop music songs,196 should not have been afforded the copyright 
protection it received by the lower court in this case. Even if most of the 
previous sentences seemed like gibberish to a reader, the same basic 
conclusion holds true: there are some elements within pop music that 
cannot and should not be copyrightable. 
In its en banc ruling, the Ninth Circuit corrected what could have 
been a devastating precedent for music copyright cases. The court 
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explained that “Jury Instruction No. 16 correctly listed non-protectable 
musical building blocks that no individual may own.”197 In fact, even 
Skidmore’s own expert “agreed [that] musical concepts like the minor 
chromatic [bass line] and the associated chords have been ‘used in music 
for quite a long time’ as ‘building blocks.’”198 In making this 
determination, the Ninth Circuit relied on past precedent and emphasized 
that never before have the courts extended copyright protection to just a 
few notes.199 This holding is in accord with the Copyright Office, which 
has consistently classified a “‘musical phrase consisting of three notes’ as 
de minimis” and therefore not meeting the modicum of creativity 
requirement under Feist.200 
The melodies of songs have always been afforded copyright 
protection. 201 Courts applying the Act protected the series of pitches and 
corresponding duration, otherwise known as the tune. By contrast, the Act 
did not afford the protection Skidmore sought from the court: repeated 
eight-note beats or the chords associated with the chromatic bassline. 
Though in its earlier opinion the Ninth Circuit focused on the  
comment in Swirsky, which stated that unlawful appropriation could occur 
through a combination of individually unprotected elements such as 
“chord progression, key, tempo, rhythm, and genre,” music cases have not 
historically worked this way nor should they.202 As a result,  
the Ninth Circuit appropriately held in its en banc decision that “the district 
court did not commit a reversible error by instructing the jury that a limited 
set of a useful three-note sequence and other common musical  
elements were not protectable.”203 
This case ultimately changed music copyright law for the better 
because it reemphasized a narrowly tailored analysis between works and 
specified noncopyrightable elements, which in turn provides clarity for 
future music copyright cases. The precedent set by this decision  
effectively allows courts to focus on a melodic inquiry through a note-by-
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note comparison between the two works. This process effectively  
permits a listener to analyze each pop song in real time, affording the 
listener the opportunity to differentiate between the two works 
automatically. Through this tailored analysis, courts will focus their 
attention on the distinct melodies of two songs; the analysis hinges on 
whether the two works share minute, inconsequential similar  
melodies or whether the works are so similar that a lay listener could easily 
determine that the melodies are the same. Thus, the Skidmore  
holding reinforces an inquiry that was once customarily applied to music 
copyright infringement cases.204 
Additionally, this en banc decision clarified the scope of 
copyrightability under the Copyright Act of 1909.205 The Act explicitly 
grants the copyright owner of a musical work the exclusive right “to make 
any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in any system of 
notation or any form of record.”206 Whether a musical element is 
protectable is a question of law.207 Given that now certain elements, such 
as bass lines or common chord progressions, will not be afforded a 
copyright protection, melody can be singled out from the overall work for 
the purpose of defining the owner’s reproduction rights. As such, the en 
banc hearing of Skidmore clarified the test for infringement and non-
protectable elements of music, offering a welcomed sigh of relief to the 
future of music copyright cases. 
Copyright law has often withheld protection from creative 
expression that could, in theory, be protected.208 For instance, the 
Copyright Office will not register certain architectural structures, such as 
bridges, cloverleafs, or dams, even though they may contain architectural 
creativity.209 Likewise, under the 1909 Act, choreographic compositions 
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could only be protected as “dramatic works” if they represented or told a 
narrative story.210 Congress deliberately chose not to protect all aspects of 
choreographic creativity, excluding protection for social dance steps and 
ballroom dances.211 
The en banc holding of Skidmore follows this logic, eliminating 
protection for certain aspects of pop music that are inherent within this 
umbrella category. The once ill-defined range of infringing similarities is 
no more. Although Skidmore’s lawyer, Francis Malofiy, thought the case 
was a “big win for the multi-billion-dollar industry against the 
creatives,”212 one major achievement cannot be overlooked: Skidmore’s 
new holding clarified the scope of copyright protection. Courts are now 
not only better equipped to handle music infringement cases, but will also 
produce more consistent holdings, allowing both attorneys and musicians 
to have a better understanding and clearer guidelines as to what elements 
constitute copyright infringement. Had Skidmore prevailed in this 
decision, lawsuits within the music industry would have likely increased 
because the lower the bar for copyright infringement in music and increase 
the risk of artists getting sued (especially relating to popular music, which 
tends to be formulaic and highly profitable).213 Instead, the en banc 
decision reduced the potential for increased lawsuits and created a lasting, 
positive impact for the future of pop music within the court system. 
CONCLUSION 
The importance of Skidmore should not go unnoticed. The court had 
the opportunity to both stifle the creativity of present and future 
songwriters and adversely impact the entire music industry. Thankfully, 
the Ninth Circuit chose to avoid the overbreadth and dangerous 
consequences of the earlier three-panel decision by rejecting  
Skidmore’s arguments and retaining the traditional approach to  
copyright infringement based off melodic structure. As a result, the now-
established precedent of the en banc Skidmore opinion can provide future 
courts with a test that produces consistent holdings and offers  
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attorneys and musicians an easily understood set of guidelines to assess 
copyright protections for musical works. 
